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ABSTRACT
Information-centric networking proposals attract much at-
tention in the ongoing search for a future communication
paradigm of the Internet. Replacing the host-to-host connec-
tivity by a data-oriented publish/subscribe service eases con-
tent distribution and authentication by concept, while elim-
inating threats from unwanted traffic at an end host as are
common in today’s Internet. However, current approaches
to content routing heavily rely on data-driven protocol events
and thereby introduce a strong coupling of the control to the
data plane in the underlying routing infrastructure. In this
paper, threats to the stability and security of the content dis-
tribution system are analyzed in theory and practical exper-
iments. We derive relations between state resources and the
performance of routers and demonstrate how this coupling
can be misused in practice. We discuss new attack vectors
present in its current state of development, as well as possi-
bilities and limitations to mitigate them.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Comm. Networks]: Network Ar-
chitecture and Design—Cryptography and Security ; C.2.2
[Computer-Comm. Networks]: Network Protocols—
Routing Protocols; C.2.6 [Computer-Comm. Net-
works]: Internetworking—Routers
Keywords
Performance, Forwarding Plane, Security, Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS), Vulnerability, Content-centric
Routing, Resource Exhaustion, Jamming, Named-data
Networking
1. INTRODUCTION
One major dedication of today’s Internet is the global
distribution of content in huge amounts. Content dis-
tribution networks (CDNs) facilitate an efficient, wide-
area replication of static data for selected content pro-
viders, whereas the end-to-end design of TCP/IP does
not foresee implicit replication and in-network storage.
There is no openly available network standard for the
asynchronous, global replication of popular content in
the current Internet.
Inspired by the use case of widely deployed CDNs,
current research has created the concepts of Content or
Information-Centric Networks. We will use the acronym
ICN to subsume the different approaches throughout
this article. ICN abandons the current Internet model
of connecting end nodes. Instead, it follows a data-
oriented publish/subscribe paradigm that facilitates con-
tent distribution and authentication by concept. In
ICN, consumers shall retrieve content by name directly
from a network that provides storage, caching, content-
based rendezvous, and searching at times.
Several proposals have been presented in recent years
[8], among them TRIAD [1], DONA [2], NDN [4, 5],
PSIRP [6], and NetInf [7], which differ in several design
choices. As we are interested in the stability and secu-
rity of ICN infrastructures, we will concentrate on the
aspects of routing and forwarding.
Essentially two approaches to routing exist in cur-
rent ICN proposals, an evolutionary path that resolves
names to locators and routes on IP (or a related location
scheme), and ‘clean slate’ concepts that route directly
on content identities. NetInf extends the current Inter-
net by a resolution service that maps content names to
topological IDs like IP addresses, but alternatively sup-
ports name-based routing. TRIAD, DONA and NDN
perform content retrieval by routing on names. Route
responses and the data itself are then forwarded along
reverse paths (RPF), either by using IP as a lower layer,
or without IP but by dedicated RPF states. PSIRP
publishes content objects to a resolution system that
incloses full knowledge of the network topology. Re-
questers trigger the mapping system to generate for-
warding identifiers, i.e., Bloom filters of aggregated link
IDs, that are used to forward of data.
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All solutions operate on the content itself, and force
the network infrastructure into a content awareness.
A mapping service is not only required to resolve file
names to source locations, but must answer a request
by advising a nearby replica, the existence of which
it learned from the data distribution system. Content
routers need to rely on (often aggregated) names in its
interface tables and – for RPF-based forwarding schemes
– a reverse state for every data unit. This control infor-
mation is highly dynamic and requires regular updates
from the data plane. The ICN paradigm thereby opens
up the control plane to continuous modifications from
the data plane. This is in contrast to the current Inter-
net, where DNS and routing states remain unaltered by
data-driven events such as file names or cache locations.
In this paper, we study the effects of control plane be-
haviour under various data conditions. We are in par-
ticular interested in threats to the stability and security
of the ICN infrastructure, whose impacts we evaluate in
a theoretical analysis and experimental trials. Experi-
ments are performed in test networks running PARC’s
CCNx software. We want to stress, though, that our
tests only attribute for the core concepts of content
routing and do not evaluate implementation properties
of the CCNx prototype. Following the basic insights
gained from theoretical and practical analysis, we con-
tribute a collection of new attacks that ground on this
transfer from data to control states.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
The specific problems in protecting the ICN infrastruc-
ture are stated in § 2 along with related work on ICN
security. We theoretically analyze basic threats to sta-
bility in § 3 and discuss related implications. Based on
practical experiments, threatening scenarios and their
effects on the routing system are demonstrated in § 4.
These general insights lead to concrete attack scenarios
in § 5. The paper concludes with a discussion in § 6.
2. WHY ICN IS CHALLENGED BY DESIGN
2.1 Problem Statement
Information-centric networking introduces two kinds
of states into the network infrastructure, (1) content
publications or announcements, and (2) subscriptions
or requests for asynchronous content access. Publica-
tion states are announced within the request routing
system or stored in some name resolution service. Sub-
scriptions are memorized hop by hop in reverse path
forwarding states, in the name system, or at commu-
nicating end nodes in IP-based systems.1 In addition,
in-network caching requires management of replicas at
1LIPSIN, as an exception, keeps record of subscriptions in
the mapping/rendezvous system to construct source routing
filters that generate distribution trees.
content routers. These statefull operations raise the fol-
lowing issues:
Resource Exhaustion: Infrastructural entities need to
offer accumulating resources like memory and pro-
cessing power for provisioning, maintaining and
exchanging content states. They are therefore threat-
ened by resource exhaustion due to misuse or un-
controlled load.
State Decorrelation: The asynchronous nature of pub-
lish/subscribe content delivery places the enhanced
burden of assuring consistency among distributed
data states. Data states that require correlation
are situated in distributed mapping systems, which
also need to consistently reflect actual content place-
ments, and in forwarding states at routers that de-
fine the paths hop-by-hop from a supplier to the
requester. Failures in state coherence may lead to
service disruptions or unwanted traffic flows.
Path & Name Infiltration: The infrastructure relies
on the integrity and correctness of content routing
and is therefore threatened by poisonous injections
of paths and names, in particular. The replica-
tive ICN environment distributes content copies to
many, commonly untrusted locations and thereby
makes it particularly hard to authenticate valid
origins of state insertion requests.
Cache Pollution: The conceptual value and the per-
formance of the ICN infrastructure is built upon
receiver-driven caching. It is therefore vulnerable
to all operations that spoil the cache relevance.
Cryptographic Breaches: Publishers, who massively
sign long-lived content, offer time and data to an
attacker for compromising cryptographic creden-
tials. The asynchronous use of public key cryp-
tography for signing large data volumes facilitates
common attacks to breach signer’s keys.
All of these threats bear the potential to seriously
degrade the ICN service and lead to insufficient or er-
roneous data dissemination. Another major risk for the
ICN infrastructure—and from a general perspective for
the ICN concept—results from the power that an end
user gains over an (open) ICN distribution backbone.
2.2 End Users Affect Backbone States
Content suppliers Related work on ICN secu-
rity has primarily focused on validating content correct-
ness and authenticity. Commonly, self-certifying secu-
rity credentials are included in ‘secure names’ that fa-
cilitate mechanisms for verifying authors, origins, and
content integrity [9, 10, 11, 12]. Thus a receiver can be
sure to obtain the correct content and an intermediate
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cache can validate the correctness of the security cre-
dentials, which finally prevents DoS on the ICN system
[13]. Nevertheless, having created (or learned) a valid
name, any ICN member can re-announce this in the
request routing system or re-register it in the content
resolution service, thereby injecting poisonous routes or
artificial names into the system.2 Similar vulnerabili-
ties of DNS and BGP are known from today’s Internet
infrastructure [14], but remain restricted to (topology)
providers. ICN opens the liberty of route injection to
the group of content suppliers (i.e., end users). We will
discuss threats unique to ICN in Section 3.1.
Security aspects of Internet caching have been studied
extensively, see [15] and refs. therein. Current work has
identified conceptual difficulties in preventing locality
attacks, as they are hard to distinguish from regular
user behaviour. It is worth noting that cache snooping
raises privacy issues in ICNs, as well. We will not dive
deeper into this well-known subject.
Content consumers Little attention has been
given to the effects of state management in ICN. Arian-
far et al. [16] discuss design choices for an ICN router.
They concentrate on the content cache and explicitly do
not consider per-request states. Perino and Varvello [17]
have evaluated requirements for content routers that
hold content information bases in Bloom filters and re-
verse paths in pending interest tables (PITs). Under
the assumptions of valid content requests propagated
on homogeneous network links with a maximum global
RTT of 80 ms, average PIT sizes are identified in the
order of 1 Gbit/s for current line speeds. FIB sizes and
lookup complexity were shown to depend nonlinearly
on prefix numbers and name lengths. Lauinger [18] ex-
plicitly addresses the threat of DoS attacks by filling
the available memory of a router with pending interest
states.
Such attacks on hardware resources may be mitigated
by limiting overall PIT sizes. However, securing router
resources by table limits does not abandon resource ex-
haustion problems which equally occur whenever tables
are filled. In the presence of a table limit, an attacker
could initiate massive drops of PIs from a router’s table
and thus disrupt data delivery to regular receivers. The
author in [18] proposes to drop interests at the head of
the PIT, which however may easily be misused to DoS-
attacking neighbors, or to use Bloom filters instead of
PIs. If applied without strict capacity limits, the latter
approach is vulnerable to flooding attacks as interface
filters degrade their selectivity.
Only recently, and after the first release of this tech-
nical report and its excerpt [19], state management and
2As a countermeasure, DONA introduces certificates of pub-
lishers on the price of per cache-instance varying names.
Content routing then works on wildcarding names, which
re-introduces the threat of route poisoning.
related security issues have been discussed in reports by
Yi et al. [3] and Gasti et al. [20]. The authors discuss
core issues of route hijacking, state overload, and cache
pollution and propose counter measures by extending
interface functions, e.g., for limiting rates and survey
content delivery. We will refer to those aspects in detail
along the lines of this article.
Intermediate Summary ICN opens the con-
trol plane of (ICN-enabled) backbone routers for con-
tent consumers and suppliers (i.e., end users) on a fine-
grained base. This is a fundamental step away from
the current Internet design and bears significant risks.
Current concerns in the context of routing mainly focus
on state explosion due to the large amount of content
items. One might argue that those resource exhaustions
will be solved by more powerful hardware in the future.
We will discuss options and limitations of related core
aspects in Section 3. Still, binding the integrity of the
routing infrastructure to end users activities is intrin-
sic to current ICN approaches—and presumably to the
overall ICN concept.
3. BASIC THREATS TO STABILITY
The control-plane in ICN will encounter changes and
processing load for each publication and for each con-
tent request. Publication states require management
in the request routing or mapping system, whenever
a content item is published/withdrawn or a cache loca-
tion is added/removed. Subscriptions initiate a grafting
of distribution states throughout the forwarding system
(DONA, NDN, NetInf) or trigger optimized path find-
ing procedures in the resolution service (PSIRP, Net-
Inf).
In this section, we theoretically discuss resulting threats
that inherently arise at the infrastructure level.
3.1 Routing or Mapping Resources
The common view on routing is that of a topological
resolution service: Routing guides the paths to hosts.
As ICN abandons the host-centric paradigm to address
content objects directly, routes to content items attain
the role of traditional topological directives.
3.1.1 State and Update Complexity
In ICN, each content item (file) needs retrieval and
therefore must be accessible via some resolution service.
This may either be implemented by a distributed rout-
ing system, or by a mapping service that provides an in-
direction to topological locators of publishers or content
caches. The average complexity of the corresponding
management operations reads 〈# of content items〉 ·
〈# cached replica〉 · 〈update frequency〉 and must be
considered a severe challenge. A global request rout-
ing system will need to host at least the amount of the
Google index base (O(1012)) at a much enhanced up-
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date frequency (by caching). For comparison, today’s
DNS subsumes O(108) names at a very low change rate
of ≈ 105 alterations per day. As a consequence, the
request routing/mapping system is stressed by adding
and updating name or cache entries at overwhelming
frequency, the details of which depend on the imple-
mentation of the service.
3.1.2 Caching On-Path versus Off-Path
Route maintenance in ICN consists of propagating
content publishers (i.e., default paths) as well as cache
instances. While the first task is known to generate
a high volume of data and frequent updates, caching
is expected to largely exceed default announcements in
number and update frequency. As a countermeasure,
data replication may be limited to caching along de-
fault paths, which remarkably reduces the complexity
for the routing system. On-path cache replica are met
implicitly when requests are routed towards the source,
and need not be advertised in the routing or mapping
service. On the downside, restricting the caching to de-
fault paths will drastically reduce its effectiveness, and
a corresponding strategy falls behind today’s CDN solu-
tions. Godsi et al. [13] discussed the caching problems
in detail. The authors came to the conclusion that on-
path caching is merely a warm-up of traditional Web
proxies.
3.1.3 Route Integrity
ICN, like the current Internet, relies on the integrity
of its routing system. A bogus route may block or de-
grade services, lead to incorrect content delivery, or vi-
olate privacy. These core concerns are well-known from
BGP [14]. Without considering protective measures
in BGP, Yi et al. [3] and Gasti et al. [20] compare
BGP with NDN security. The authors argue that the
NDN approach reduces vulnerability to black-holing, as
routers can identify unresolved content requests and
rank/re-route per prefix and interface. Nevertheless,
these countermeasures cannot prevent attacks of inter-
ception and redirection with service degradation.
Aside from those vulnerabilities known from BGP
routing, the following threats uniquely arise for content-
centric routing.
Route Set Inflation Almost all ICN solutions allow
for universal caching without explicit authoriza-
tion. Any in-network cache can thus announce
any content name, while origin validation mea-
sures such as RPKI [21] cannot be applied.
Route-to-Death Route redirections may be applied
to slow down content delivery or to jitter response
times. As the routing infrastructure is vulnera-
ble to increased delays and delay variations, cor-
responding threats arise (see Section 3.2).
Ri The i-th Router
Ci Capacity of the link between Ri and Ri+1
Ui Utilization of the link between Ri and Ri+1
Si # of content request states of Ri at its in-
terface towards Ri+1
αi Content request rate at interface Ri → Ri+1
ωi Content arrival rate at interface Ri ← Ri+1
Ti Request timeout at interface Ri → Ri+1
l Packet length
〈·〉 Average value of ·
σ(·) Standard deviation of ·
Table 1: Glossary of Notations
3.2 Forwarding Resources
Traditional routers in today’s Internet consist of a
central processing unit and main memory that are avail-
able to the control plane, mainly to learn and deter-
mine new routes, as well as FIB memory that is fed
by the route selection process. Data forwarding re-
mains bound to FIB lookup and packet processing at
line-cards. This design choice purposefully decouples
forwarding capacities from control processing and–with
equal importance—protects control states from (bogus)
data packets.
Current concepts of content-centric data forwarding
break with this separation paradigm, and introduce—
similar to multicast—an additional reverse path for-
warding table, also called PIT. Unlike in multicast, this
table is updated packet-wise on line speed by data-driven
events. In the following subsections, we concentrate on
the consequences for routing resources in detail. We will
consider a chain of routers Pi along a data path and use
the notation summarized in Table 1.
3.2.1 Content Request States versus Content Request
Rates versus Network Utilization
Content request states, i.e., Pending Interests in NDN,
are the essential building block to flow control in a
content-centric distribution system that operates hop-
by-hop. Each request state will trigger a data packet
on return, why the number of open request states cor-
responds to data arrival at this interface after the trans-
mission time.
Consider a point-to-point interface between routers in
steady operation and in the presence of a (per interface)
state timeout Ti. In the absence of request retransmis-
sions, packet loss, and state dismissal, we first want to
derive the relation between router states at time t and
network capacity. The basic rate equation reads
4
Si(t) = Si(t− Ti) +
∫ t
t−Ti
αi(τ)− ωi(τ)dτ
= Si(t− Ti) +
∫ t
t−Ti
αi(τ)− αi(pi(τ))dτ
= 〈αi〉 ·min(〈RTT 〉, Ti) +
O (σ(αi) · σ(min(RTT, Ti))) , (1)
where pi(.) denotes the time shift corresponding to the
packet arrival process and RTT the random variable of
packet round trip times, which is assumed independent
of the requests and packet rates.
From Equation (1), we can immediately deduce that
timeout values below the (varying)RTTs limit the num-
ber of request states, but at the same time will block
data forwarding. A second view reveals the strong de-
pendence of states on the RTT variation. A similar
phenomenon is well-known from TCP [22], but has been
overlooked in corresponding previous work on ICN re-
source considerations [17, 3, 20].
Henceforth we will address the case of data flowing
unhindered by the state timeout Ti. Furthermore—for
a steady-state scenario—it is assumed that the content
request rate fluctuates on the same stationary scale.
Equation (1) then simplifies to
Si(t) ≈ 〈αi〉 · (〈RTT 〉+ κσ(RTT )) (2)
≈ Ui(t)/〈l〉 (〈RTT 〉+ κσ(RTT )) , (3)
with an estimating parameter κ for the mean devia-
tion.3 For the last step, we roughly assumed that con-
tent requests and content arrival are in stationary equi-
librium.
Approximation (3) yields the desired coupling of the
link utilization and the state management resources at
a router: On a single point-to-point link without state
retransmissions and in flow balance, state requirements
are proportional to the network utilization, enhanced by
a factor of a global retransmission timeout. At switched
interconnects or in bursty communication scenarios, con-
ditions are expected to grow much worse.
The following observations are noteworthy.
1. Unlike in TCP that estimates a single end-to-end
connection, content request states at routers ag-
gregate prefixes and numerous flows to various con-
tent prefixes. Moreover, content items (prefixes)
are explicitly not bound to end points. Thus rapidly
varying RTTs are characteristic to interfaces and
3The corresponding (over-)estimator in TCP is commonly
set to 4. However, it is well known that standard TCP al-
gorithms and parameters are inefficient at rapidly changing
round trip times, which are characteristic for interface con-
ditions in content-centric routing.
even to flows in content-centric routing. The pres-
ence of chunk caching may even increase the RTT
variation. Hence, no convergent estimator for a
round trip time can be reasonably given.4
2. In the current Internet, the variation of RTT is
commonly larger than its average. End-to-end de-
lays are known to approximately follow a heavy-
tailed Gamma distribution [23]. PingER [24] re-
ports means and standard deviations of about 250 ms,
with maxima up to 5,000 ms.
3. Limiting the absolute size of the content request
table imposes a strict bound on network utiliza-
tion. However, the sustained rates are mainly de-
termined by actual RTTs and are hardly predictable.
Similar arguments hold for defining timeout val-
ues.
4. A corresponding picture arises, when content re-
quest rates are limited instead of table sizes.5 For
an ’on average’ optimal limit Ci · 〈RTT 〉/〈l〉, the
variation of content replies in time may lead to
large over- and under-utilization of network re-
sources that goes along with large fluctuations in
request table sizes.
3.2.2 Memory Requirements
A content-centric router that is designed to fully uti-
lize its link capacities, requires sufficient table space
for content requests under varying network conditions.
Equation (3) approximates the corresponding resources
when applied to the maximum link capacity Ci. Using
the conservative value of κ = 4 as for TCP, a packet
length l = 1,000 bytes, and RTT values from PingER
as cited in the previous section, we derive
Si = 1, 25 s/8.000 bit · Ci ≈ 1, 6 · 10−4s/bit · Ci (4)
For a line-speed of 1 to 100 Gbit/s, 160k to 16,000k
content request entries then need to be installed per
interface at minimum.6 Due to the more accurate in-
clusion of RTT variation terms, these findings differ
from previous results [17, 3] by more than an order of
magnitude. Still they are merely a rough estimate, as
larger fluctuations of round trip times may significantly
increase resource demands.
It is noteworthy that Equation (4) holds for any router
in a content-centric Internet. Unlike today, where full
4Yi et al. [3] propose to maintain RTT estimators per pre-
fix and interface in the FIB, which would find its analogy in
BGP by adding RTT estimators per IP prefix. The evalua-
tion of such quantities would not only require an extensive
pairwise probing, but at the end is not well defined for (ag-
gregated) prefixes.
5Rate limiting has been currently proposed in [3].
6This number may well underestimate the need by an order
of magnitude or two.
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BGP tables are only required at AS border routers, and
interior devices operate on a very small routing table,
CCN access routers already demand for a full PIT mem-
ory, the size of which is determined by its interface ca-
pacities. In practice, this significantly increases router
costs, as any fast interface must co-locate a large block
of fast memory.
3.2.3 CPU Load from Table Management
An ICN content router maintains states according to
user data requests. For any content request, it needs to
(1) insert a state in its request table. On the arrival of
any data packet, it needs to (2) search and (3) delete on
success in the same table. These operations are required
at line speed. In addition, a router has to (4) maintain
timers of all (soft) states in its content request table.
The paradigmatic shift of ICN opens the state ta-
ble, which is responsible for data delivery, to the end
users. Any content requester may create unexpected
access patterns. Consequently, to guarantee robustness,
an implementation of the request table not only needs
to perform dictionary operations very efficiently on av-
erage but also in worst-case. As there is no final design
of an ICN router, we discuss the general design space
for hash tables in this context.
The most efficient implementation is the usage of
on-chip content-addressable memory (CAM), which is
the complete hardware counterpart of a dictionary data
structure. However, costs, energy, and limited size pro-
hibit its deployment for expected PIT tables sizes. Typ-
ically, state tables for request routing (or caching) are
implemented using hash tables. In its elementary form,
these data structures can perform all basic dictionary
operations (i.e., insert, search, and delete) at constant
complexity, but experience hash collisions. Collisions
cause a conflict: An implementation that ignores hash
collisions will overwrite data. This limits the field of
application for ICN, as dealing with collisions increases
complexity, or making the system directly threatened
by DoS.
In ICN, Perino and Varvello [17], for example, pro-
pose to use HC-basic [25], a collision-prone scheme with-
out avoidance mechanisms. Such a design choice makes
the ICN system vulnerable to (also purposefully) replac-
ing valid content requests. In realistic deployments of
ICN, an implementation of hash tables will either pro-
vide mechanisms to prevent or to handle hash collisions.
Essentially four solutions are known to overcome hash
collisions: (1) Hash chaining or open addressing, (2)
perfect hashing, (3) cryptographic hash functions, and
(4) universal hashing.
Hash chaining (i.e., concatenating conflicting keys) or
open addressing (i.e., deterministic probing for an alter-
nate location) [26] circumvent collisions on the price of
enhanced update costs. The worst case complexity in-
creases to O(N) for a table of size N . This introduces
well-known vulnerabilities, as any pattern that creates
collisions will result in such linear complexity instead of
amortized O(1). Crosby and Wallach [27] analyzed this
for current software systems (e.g., the Bro IDS). For the
more sophisticated and widely deployed hardware hash
tables Peacock and Cuckoo, Ben-Porat et al. [28] re-
cently studied the structural vulnerability and observed
significant performance degradation, as well. Applying
these approaches to ICN introduces an obvious threat.
“Perfect hashing” [26] supports constant complexity
in the worst-case, but requires a static key set. It is
thus not suitable for dynamic content requests that are
characteristic in ICN.
Collision resistant cryptographic hash functions can
be applied, but lead to a prohibitive increase in mem-
ory and CPU consumptions. Enabling cryptographic
operations at backbone routers has been discussed con-
tinuously in the context of securing BGP [14] and did
not succeeded so far. In contrast to requests in ICN,
BGP updates occur rarely (even if we consider update
storms) and will be sent by known peers. ICN would
have to apply cryptographic hashing to all Interest pack-
ets. Cryptographic hash functions are—with respect
to the packet processing requirements in ICN and cur-
rent, long-term hardware development—out–of–scope
also for a future implementation of the ICN paradigm.
A trade-off between performance and worst-case avoid-
ance can be implemented by universal hashing [29]. It
has been introduced to obfuscate the hash function by
randomly selecting the hashing algorithm at start-up.
Unfortunately, universal hashing is difficult to imple-
ment in hardware. Moreover, it still shows a collision
probability which is small compared to basic hashing
but high compared to cryptographic hash functions.
Threats based on fingerprinting make the system ad-
ditionally vulnerable. It should also be noted that uni-
versal hash tables cannot be deployed in a distributed
fashion, but are confined to strictly local use cases due
to the random selection of hash function. Collaborating
request management is thus challenged.
For a detailed overview on state-of-the-art hash ta-
bles for high-speed packet processing, we refer to the
excellent work by Kirsch et al. [30]. Even though wire-
speed hash tables are deployed in the current Internet, it
is by no means obvious that these approaches provide
sufficient robustness in daily ICN operation. Current
solutions exhibit serious attack vectors, either by DoS
collision overwrite or by a non-constant worst-case per-
formance. In addition, even a constant complexity does
not guarantee appropriate robustness as extra memory
accesses can prevent wire speed performance.
3.3 Discussion
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ICN approaches introduce three major changes to the
current, well approved Internet infrastructure:
1. Information objects become first class routable net-
work entities.
2. The control plane of the routing system is opened
to the end users, who are entitled to implement
states at routers that are managed by data-driven
events.
3. The end-to-end design principle is abandoned in
favor of of a hop-by-hop routing coordination.
All of these novelties impose severe challenges to an
infrastructure serving the needs of a future content-
centric Internet. While the first change threatens an
infrastructure design by the mere amount of entities to
be accommodated, an opening of the control plane gives
rise to manifold attack vectors. In such an environ-
ment of a open access to infrastructure states, security
and robustness measures need to be applied to many
more constituents of the distribution system than in
today’s Internet. In addition, the requirement of man-
aging states in line with data forces any of the (user-
centred) operations at the control plane to run at wire
speed. The latter is an exceptionally hard challenge, as
even operations of constant complexity may exceed the
realm of wire speed processing.
Finally, the hop-by-hop approach applied in contrast
to the end-to-end concept promises the advantage of
early adaptation to changing network conditions. How-
ever, the problem of resource coordination makes hop-
by-hop forwarding significantly less robust than solu-
tions built upon the end-to-end design principle. In fact,
it is very easy to construct cross-traffic scenarios that
lead to disastrous performance of hop-by-hop forward-
ing paths. Lead by this insight, Carofiglio et al. [31]
propose to build ICN on a hybrid solution of AIMD
(additive increase, multiplicative decrease) applied to
intermediate routers and end points. However, the au-
thors did not account for effects of delay and delay vari-
ation between content requests and content fulfillment.
In addition, aggregation needs to be taken into account
that spoils the concept of adapting to individual flow
parameters.
When examined from the conceptional side, ICN so-
lutions raise many fundamental problems and—up un-
til now—fail to resolve the corresponding problems. It
is the aim of the present paper to identify challenges
and sharpen the view on issues that require resolution.
Detailed solutions of the identified problems are out of
scope for the present work.
In the following, we will experimentally evaluate the
content delivery system for the example of name-based
routing. To analyze the behavior of the correspond-
ing infrastructure, we perform only common ICN op-
erations (i.e., subscriptions of existing and non-existing
ccnxshort
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Hop 1 ccnxlongHop 2 ccn
xlon
g
Hop
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ccnxlong
Hop 3
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Figure 1: Topology in the experimental setting
data) in a straightforward topology with a simple con-
tent model. This allows us to omit side effects due to
complex routing or caching issues.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of straight-
forward experiments that show the outcome of the core
threats as theoretically discussed in Section 3. In par-
ticular, we concentrate on system and performance im-
plications of the data-driven state management at in-
frastructure devices. Even though the measurements
mainly relate to the NDN implementation ccnd, we
should emphasize that we do not evaluate the imple-
mentation itself, but use it as one real-world instance
of the information-centric network deployment to illus-
trate the routing protocol mechanisms. Following this
spirit, we do not interpret or discuss absolute perfor-
mance values, which surely can be improved by opti-
mized software and hardware in the future, but focus
on structural and asymptotic analysis.
4.1 Core Measurement Setup
In our measurement study, we purposefully deploy
simple communication scenarios between one content
requester and one publisher. The basic network topol-
ogy is represented by a Daisy chain of directly inter-
linked CCNx routers with 100 Mbit/s, one end connects
the content consumer and the other the content reposi-
tory (see Fig. 1). The basic topology consists of two hops
and the extended topology of five nodes. It is noteworthy
that more complex settings, e.g., a Dumbbell topology
popular to represent backbone network effects, would
enforce the effects, which we already see in our simpler
and more transparent examples.
We use the CCNx implementation version 0.5.1 [32],
i.e., the client library to announce content Interests, the
content repository to store data, and the ccnd to for-
ward subscription and data. The following analysis fo-
cuses on the effects on the router side. For obtaining
a fine-grained view, we concentrate on the local system
as well as inter-router dependencies.
For all CCNx parameters, we leave default values.
In particular, routers do not follow a specific strategy
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layer, as this would push resource consumption towards
specifically twisted but equivalent results as discussed
in Section 2. This also implies deactivated rate limit-
ing, which additionally introduces further attack vectors
(cf., Section 5.3). CCNx routers communicate via TCP
(preserving packet order in the basic experiments) or
UDP (extended experiments).
4.2 Resource Consumption: Basic Experiments
4.2.1 A Fast Path to Resource Exhaustion
An elementary threat intrinsic to data-driven state
management arises from the overloading of routers by
Interest requests. This is most easily provoked by ini-
tiating requests for content that does not exist. In our
scenario, the consumer issues 2,000 Interest messages
for non-existing content, waits 6 seconds, and repeats
these steps until overall 150,000 Interests have been
sent.
Figure 2 shows the local resource consumptions on the
first hop of the content receiver. The number of entries
in the Pending Interest Table (PIT), the CPU load, and
the required memory increase linearly with subsequent
bulks of Interest messages until the system is saturated.
In this case, the router reaches its limits of processing
and memory resources when storing ≈ 120,000 PIT en-
tries. While sending Interests, the initiating node re-
transmits previous announcements to keep states fresh
at the router. Even though the retransmission timer
is below the expiration timer and network delays are
very short, the PIT size fluctuates as entries drop due
to overloading. After all initial Interest messages have
been distributed, the content consumer only retransmits
subscriptions.
Our experiment illustrates several problems: A router
may easily exhaust PIT space, but even if it was able to
store all entries, it would suffer from a ‘retransmission
only’ phase. The retransmissions agglomerate over time
and create a continuous stream of signaling that con-
sumes CPU cycles. When the update rate is higher than
the processing capabilities permit, retransmissions re-
quire buffering, which leads to additional memory over-
head (cf., Figure 2). A high system load increases the
probability of dropping a PIT entry even if its refresh
message has been signaled in time. This again causes
additional operations on the PIT data structure (add/
delete calls) and fosters the momentum of load.
In a recent publication, Yi et al. [33] propose to miti-
gate this threat by signaling content unavailability back
to the original requester. Such NACK will cure the Inter-
est retransmission effects discussed above, while at the
same time NACK suppression introduces a new attack
vector at the supplier side. Unhindered by the presence
of NACK, a bogus requester still can harm the routing
infrastructure (in particular its designated router) by
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Figure 2: Load at the designated router of the
receiver while requesting non-existing content
subsequent new Interest messages for unavailable con-
tent.
4.2.2 Chunk-based State Multiplication
To analyze the performance of content consumption,
we conduct a bulk file transfer. At this, the content re-
ceiver initiates the parallel download of multiple 10 Mbit
files over a constant time. We consider three extremes,
the request of 2 files, 10 files, and 100 files per second.
Figure 3 shows the start and completion time of the
download per file (top graph), as well as the Pending
Interest Table (PIT) size, the effective number of Inter-
est retransmissions, and the traffic load including the
mean goodput at the first hop. For visibility reasons,
we rescaled the y-axis of PI in Figure 3(a).
With an increasing number of parallel downloads not
only the download time increases significantly, but also
the interval of the request and receive phase grows in
the scenarios of overload. While the download time is
almost constant for two files per second (cf., Fig. 3(a)),
the stop time diverges non-linearly from the beginning
of the download in the cases of excessive parallelism (cf.,
Fig. 3(b),(c)). 150 s are needed to download each single
file in the worst case (Fig. 3(c)), while the link capacity
would permit to retrieve all files in about 10 s.
The reason for this performance flaw is visualized in
the subjacent graphs. A higher download frequency
leads to an increasing number of simultaneous PIT en-
tries, which require coordination with the data plane.
Each file request will be split into requests of multi-
ple chunks, in which the generation of corresponding
Interest messages will be pipelined. In contrast to Sec-
tion 4.2.1, content exists. As soon as the content tra-
verses, Interest states dissolve and thus release mem-
ory. These operations cause a simultaneous burst in
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Figure 3: Parallel download of 10 Mbit files: Start and stop time of the download per file at the re-
ceiver & resource consumption at its designated router [Pending Interests (PI), Interest Retransmits
(IR), and Network Load (NL) including the mean goodput]
CPU load (not shown) and result in growing Interest
retransmits after droppings or timeouts (shown in sec-
ond lowest graphs). This also leads to retransmissions
of data chunks. As an overall net effect, the network uti-
lization fluctuates significantly, but does not adapt to
actual user demands: Even though data requests could
fill the links easily, the average load remains about con-
stant at 30 % of the total network capacity.
In this example we demonstrated that insufficient pro-
cessing and memory resources will strictly prevent a
proper link utilization. This problem cannot be mit-
igated by rate limiting, as reduced Interest transmis-
sion rates will simultaneously reduce network utilization
even further (see Section 3.2.1).7
The only visible way to assure proper utilization of
network resources requires appropriate routing resources,
i.e., a PI table implementation that is sufficiently large
and reliably operates at line speed. As we learned from
the analysis in Section 3.2, corresponding solutions are
not available today. At the current state of the art, an
attacker can always reproduce the performance degra-
dations by either blowing up RTT and its variation, or
by injecting states that degrade the performance of the
PI hash table of the routers.
4.3 State Propagation and Correlation:
Extended Experiments
In our extended experiments, we take a closer look
at hop-by-hop routing performance using the five node
routing chain displayed in the lower part of Figure 1.
Intermediate nodes are numbered from the designated
7We should remind that applying Interest rates in NDN is a
mechanism of flow control, and not for system resource pro-
tection. Intermingling these two aspects is likely to produce
unwanted performance flaws and leads to new attacks (cf.,
Section 5.3).
router of the content receiver (first hop) to the router
of the content repository (fifth hop). In the first step,
we specicically concentrate on correlation effects of a
single requester/publisher pair, thereby neglecting any
competing cross traffic. Instead, we steer and survey
routing resources in our experimental setup by using
parametrizable virtual machines.
4.3.1 Extending the Easy: A Homogeneous Network
In this first extended experiment, we simply move our
previous picture to the larger topology. All forward-
ing nodes offer the same resources, two cores@2.4 GHz,
3 GB RAM, and link capacities of 100 Mbit/s. A con-
tent requester downloads 500 files of size 10 Mbit at an
average rate of 100 files per second.
The corresponding results are visualized in Figure 4.
It is nicely visible, how Interest state and retransmis-
sion management propagate through the network, show-
ing an overall flattening towards the source, because
states resolve earlier from faster packet delivery. Re-
source challenges due to state management as discussed
in Section 4.2 lead to an accumulated reduction in net-
work utilization. The network goodput decreases from
≈ 30 Mbit/s to≈ 8 Mbit/s, a reduction that is about lin-
ear in the number of hops. Correspondingly, the down-
load times increase from ≈ 150 s to ≈ 250 s.
4.3.2 Device Heterogeneity: A Single Point
of Weakness
It is a valid assumption that the content distribution
system will consist of heterogeneous devices in terms
of all performance metrics. In this second experiment,
we introduce device heterogeneity by weakening a single
router, the 4th hop (CCNx4), in a controlled way. We
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Figure 4: Routing and forwarding performance in a homogeneous five-hop network
1 2 3 4 50
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Ma
x. M
em
ory
 Co
nsu
mp
tion
 [M
B]
CCNx Node [#]
 80k 100k 120k 150k
(a) Memory Consumption
1 2 3 4 50
20
40
60
80
100
 
 
Ave
rag
e C
PU
 Lo
ad 
[%]
CCNx Node [#]
 80k 100k 120k 150k
(b) Average CPU Load
Figure 5: Load per hop for a chain of 5 routers
while initiating a 80k, 100k, 120k, and 150k dif-
ferent Interests for non-existing content
want to study the reaction of state management and
network performance to this well-defined degradation.
For an initial observation of the dependency on the
weakest node, we reduce the CPU capacity of CCNx4
to 25 % (600 MHz) and recap the scenario from Sec-
tion 4.2.1 for 80k, 100k, 120k, and 150k subscriptions of
non-existing content. Independent of the capacity of the
network infrastructure, the consumer initiates content
subscriptions and continuously refreshes its Interests,
which then propagate towards the content repository.
Figure 5 shows the maximal memory consumption
and the average CPU load per hop during the measure-
ment period. It is clearly visible that the required mem-
ory mainly depends on the position of the node within
the topology. Memory requirements on the single path
fluctuate by two orders of magnitude. The predecessor
of the node with the lowest processing capacities (i.e.,
the 4th hop) needs 50% – 500% more memory than any
other nodes.
In this scenario of reliable transport for signaling mes-
sages, a bottleneck node puts pronounced load onto its
predecessor as the forwarding of the refresh messages
retain. The reason for this strongly unbalanced perfor-
mance picture can be found in RTT fluctuations: The
weak on-path router appears like a periodically effec-
tive blockade for Interest transmission. In general, het-
erogeneous network conditions lead to a discontinuous
propagation of Interest states and thus to a fluctuating
performance. The successors of the weak router then
do not receive state updates in time, and the predeces-
sors experience large waiting periods. Correspondingly,
the results displayed in Figure 5 impressively demon-
strate the effects of time fluctuations in content-centric
routing.
4.3.3 Steady-State Stability
In the next step of our analysis, we take a closer look
on gradual effects of routing heterogeneity. We observe
corrective mechanisms of the network (i.e., Interest re-
transmissions) depending on router asymmetry. Inter-
est retransmissions serve as the key indicator for time-
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outs due to router overload. For this task, we configure
CCNx4 with four different processing capacities related
to the other CCNx routers: 2,400 MHz (homogeneous),
1,200 MHz (50 % capacity), and 600 MHz (25 % capac-
ity).
Surprising results are shown in Figure 6. Evidently
we see that network behavior switches on the occurrence
of router heterogeneity, independent of its strengths.
The characteristic behaviour of the balanced network
is a steady decay of Interest retransmits towards the
source, as data delivery gets faster and more reliable
in proximity to the publisher. However, at the first
occasion of a ‘bottleneck’, the picture flips. Interest re-
transmission drastically increases and all routers except
for the bottleneck equally see about the maximal rate of
retransmissions in this scenario. State retransmissions
at the weak forwarder (CCNx4) instantaneously dou-
bles to the level of managed states this router can cope
with.
This experiment clearly shows how sensitive content-
centric routing reacts to varying network resources. A
light disturbance of the state propagation process re-
veals the instability of a steady-state flow by immedi-
ately turning content transport into a significantly dif-
ferent condition of maximal error management.
4.3.4 Complex Inhomogeneities
In our final experiment concerned with content rout-
ing, we want to explore situations of largely decorre-
lated network conditions. Therefore we configure all
routers to admit fast changing resources occurring in
anti-cycles. In detail, each intermediate router (CCNx2,
. . . , CCNx4) is forced into a periodic CPU reduction by
90 % of 30 s. Resource reduction periods were shifted
between routers by 15 s so that at least one of the three
routers in the forwarding chain was kept in challenged
conditions. The objective of this repelling setup, which
similarly may well occur from different side traffics in
a meshed backbone, is to analyse the vulnerability of
hop-by-hop state maintenance in content-centric rout-
ing.
Results of this alternating resource scenario are dis-
played in Figure 7. Visualisation is completely analo-
gous to the initial view on a homogeneous network (see
Figure 4). The course of pending Interests as well as In-
terest retransmissions open a distinguished view on the
fine-grained sensitivity of content routing to neighbor-
ing router conditions. State provisioning fluctuates on
the resource resolution scale of 30 s throughout the net-
work. More importantly, data transmission rates drop
down to about 2.4 Mbit/s, while the overall load of In-
terest states remains compatible to the homogeneous
network. Uncoordinated network resource availability
thus leads to a low overall performance in conjunction
with high network resource consumptions. Time-to-
completion for each single file download correspondingly
explodes to 900 s for the same 10 Mbit files as in our
initial experiment. It should be recalled that network
capacities do allow for a simultaneous download of all
500 files within 10 s.
4.3.5 A Comparative Summary
In the different scenarios of our experimentally-driven
analysis, we have revealed a number of structural weak-
nesses and effects immanent to the current state of content-
centric routing in heterogeneous multi-hop scenarios.
All examples lead to severe service degradations. Nev-
ertheless the question arises on how these insights com-
bine to a consistent view.
We will try to present an overall picture in the fol-
lowing. Figure 8 contrasts the load imposed onto the
infrastructure by Interest states with the average net-
work performance in the three experimental scenarios,
homogeneous network, single point of weakness, and al-
ternating resources at routers. The striking picture in
all three settings is that the efficiency of network utiliza-
tion is low on the overall, but drastically drops when-
ever inhomogeneities occur. The hop-by-hop forward-
ing performance thus must be considered rather fragile.
In contrast, network state propagation attains various
patterns, but always remains at compatible level at the
router of maximal load.
These observations suggest the following rule of thumb
for CCN routing performance: State maintenance al-
ways follows the maximal requirements, while forward-
ing performance will adapt to the weakest resource in
place. This overall picture is clearly inefficient and fu-
ture work on ICN solutions would largely benefit from
improving this behaviour.
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Figure 7: Routing and forwarding performance in a five-hop network with alternating CPU reductions
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Figure 8: Comparison of state management and forwarding performance in different network scenarios
(mean and standard variation)
5. EXAMPLES OF ATTACK SCENARIOS
In this section, we will outline and briefly discuss new
attack scenarios that arise from data-driven state man-
agement in ICN. We will illustrate these examples by
terms related to our experiments on CCNx (e.g., PIT),
but should emphasize the general applicability to sub-
scription resp. publication states as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.
5.1 Attacks Related to Resource Exhaustion
As shown in the previous section, routing and for-
warding capacities of the infrastructure can be easily
compromised by overloading its content request or inter-
est tables. As non-aggregable name requests for locally
unavailable content propagate through the network, re-
source exhaustion attacks can be transparently initiated
from the remote. For this purpose it remains completely
indifferent whether hardware resources are drained at
unrestricted PIT sizes or table space exhausts accord-
ing to various limiting configurations. Correspondingly,
FIB overflows at routers occur in response to excessive
publications or updates of names. Details of the at-
tacker’s effects depend on the state-dropping strategy—
for simplicity we assume dropping tails as used by CCNx.
In addition, virtual resources may also be depleted. The
injection of bogus Interests disturbs ICN flow control
mechanisms at routers, for example, because it reduces
request limits.
Remotely Initiated Overload An attacker that
controls one or more machines (a botnet) may initiate
massive requests for locally unavailable content. Corre-
sponding interests propagate towards the publisher and
eventually accumulate at some content router causing
overload conditions. Depending on its intensity, this
attack will lead to a service impairment or DoS for the
(remote) content distribution tree(s) branching at the
degraded router, unless the networking system is able to
re-route the requests. It is worth noting that timeouts
at regular users on the subtree will initiate retransmis-
sion ‘storms’ and thereby amplify the attack.
Piling Requests due to a Slow Source Perfor-
mance of a content source may be degraded by artifi-
cially high numbers of direct requests causing slowed
down responsiveness. Alternatively, a captured source
or its overloaded access router may drastically increase
response times of content delivery. In slowing down
a (popular) source, an attacker lowers the data return
rate and thereby the extinction of pending interests at
all routers on paths to receivers. Thus attacking a sin-
gle point may result in a widely increased load at the
routing infrastructure.
Mobile Blockade A mobile node (MN) may issue
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a large number of invalid interests that block the PIT of
the mobile access router for the period of state timeout.
In a shared link-layer environment that cannot easily
detect its departure, the mobile adversary can traverse
neighboring networks on circular routes and continue to
offload its interest bundle with the effect of a blockade
of the regionally available networks. Initial counter-
measures are difficult to apply, as the retransmission of
interests is part of the regular mobility pattern in ICN.
Fooling Rate Limiting Current ICN approaches [3]
propose rate limiting to restrict the number of Interest
states. Its main purpose is flow control to avoid con-
gestion. In contrast to common believes (see [20] for
discussions) we argue that this is not an appropriate
countermeasure to protect the ICN distribution system
against attacks. An attacker can easily create an in-
terest storm that exceeds the anticipated interest limit.
The dedicated router will throttle the number of ac-
cepted interests per interface or interface+prefix, and
finally ignore subsequent interests. Consequently, a sin-
gle end user blocks a prefix or harms all members of its
domain.
Note, applying rate limiting per end host (or user) is
non-trivial in ICN. ICN explicitly discontinues the con-
cept of host identifiers (e.g., due to security reasons).
Thus, a router cannot track particular sources that send
an unexpected amount of interests. Even if routers are
enabled with such a function, an attacker can spoof ad-
dresses.
The same holds for push-back mechanisms [20], which
signal an overload towards the source and thus try to
isolate an attacker. In addition, an attacker that would
receive such a control message can ignore it.
5.2 Attacks Related to State Decorrelation
ICN requires consistent states during the request rout-
ing phase and the asynchronous content delivery. While
bogus announcements or flapping of routes may intro-
duce loops or increase the likelihood thereof, incoherent
forwarding paths may result in partial content trans-
mission that uses network resources without success in
data delivery.
Infringing Content States An attacker that con-
trols end systems or content routers could announce up-
dates of content or cache appearances at a frequency
that exceeds the (local) content request routing con-
vergence time. As a consequence, the overloaded an-
nouncement or mapping system will be unable to cor-
rectly process the updates of proper content sources or
caches with the effect of incomplete content represen-
tation and erroneous data replication states. Content
requesters will be thus led into false retrievals or access
failures. As content announcement is commonly built
on soft-state approaches, failures will eventually time-
out after a period of undisclosed inconsistency, which
the adversary could initiate in a momentary attack.
Timeout Attack The timeouts of pending inter-
ests fire independently in a distributed network envi-
ronment, which is normally healed by early refreshes.
An attacker that controls one or more machines may
interfere with state coordination by degrading the per-
formance of two or more on-path routers so that request
routing and data forwarding exhibit large, fluctuating
delays in the order of the timeout. As a consequence,
intermediate timers will erase interests with large prob-
ability prior to data delivery or retransmission requests.
Corresponding receivers will suffer from DoS for the af-
fected chunks or arbitrarily large transmission delays.
Jamming Attack A node on a shared link may
issue a large number of content requests without main-
taining the interests at its own (loosing interest). Con-
tent will then arrive at the local link without a receiver.
This scenario is particularly harmful in mobile environ-
ments of limited bandwidth. A mobile attacker can jam
a region by traversing shared radio links while request-
ing bulk data.
5.3 Attacks Related to Path and Name Infil-
tration
ICN raises content names and cache locations to first
class objects and must therefore remain open to naming
and placing data. The request routing system carries
routes to names in its FIB or a mapping service, both of
which are vulnerable to resource exhaustion and route
poisoning. While an explosion in the pure number of
names may be mitigated in parts by aggregation ac-
cording to some authoritative naming conventions like
in today’s domain names, bogus route infiltration must
be considered the more delicate issue.
Route Hijacking An adversary may announce (or
register) routes to cached copies of any content object.
Content requests from its vicinity are then directed to-
wards the malicious system and – if unanswered or re-
tarded – lead to long-lasting forwarding states and a
possible DoS. This threat can be mitigated by resource-
intensive attempts to route towards multiple locations
that become increasingly painful when an attacker con-
trols a botnet and injects invalid routes at large scale.
Route Interception Alternatively, an adversary
may keep record of the valid routes to the content, while
it announces various malicious routes. Content requests
can then be intercepted and forwarded to the proper
location. The intruder will thus gain knowledge of the
content consumed in the networks under attack, while
receivers experience a normal network behavior. This
privacy violation may allow for highly selective infor-
mation, whenever the attacker is topologically close to
the victim.
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6. CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed network instabilities
in information-centric networks that are caused by (a)
data-driven state management and (b) backbone states
initiated by end users.
Some threats are easy to anticipate (e.g., resource ex-
haustion), others are more intricate due to the complex
interplay of distributed states (e.g., state decorrelation).
For the latter previous practical insights in the design
of (conceptually related) multicast protocols already re-
vealed good and bad design options. One of the ma-
jor design goals of Bidirectional PIM [34], for example,
was
”
eliminating the requirement for data-driven proto-
col events“—after the operating experiences with data-
driven DVMRP or PIM-SM. We are somewhat puzzled
that those insights seem to have been ignored by the
ICN community. With this paper we want to stimu-
late the discussion about basic threats and attacks on
content-centric backbone routing. We admit that re-
solving the identified problems is definitely challenging
as this either reduces capabilities of the ICN infrastruc-
ture or flexibility at the end user.
The exhaustion of memory and processing resources
following excessive state allocations and manipulations
was identified as one major reason for service degra-
dation and DoS attacks. An obvious approach to mit-
igate the resource exhaustion problem is to limit the
rates of state injection into the network. Applying re-
strictions per domain (e.g., [33]) will create new attack
vectors from the interior, while limiting users will re-
quire tracking of end nodes and leads to traffic shaping
and bandwidth restrictions. As content states will accu-
mulate in the network, and inter-provider deployment
almost surely will lead to a heterogeneous, unbalanced
design, rate limiting may milden, but cannot effectively
prevent the resource exhaustion problems discussed in
this paper.
The other major threat to ICN stability arises from
the ease of malicious name or route infiltration. Even
though similar vulnerabilities are known from BGP, ICN
backbones will be populated by data-centric states—
created, modified or deleted by any end-user of the
network—and thus largely magnify the problem scope
of poisoning the control plane.
Current CDN deployments remain agnostic of these
infringements by running under proprietary regimes.
Still, if we want the Future Internet to remain open for
every content published by any user, we cannot impose
restrictions that approach today’s CDN regulations in
any way.
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